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FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL:
THE JUDGE'S VIEW*
BERNARD S. MEYER**
One of the fundamentals of our concept of justice is a fair
and impartial trial before an unbiased judge and an unprejudiced
jury. To that end we have established an elaborate system intended
to assure that persons who make up the jury panel are selected
at random and are, in general, representative of the population of
the area. For that purpose, when the petit jury before which a
particular case will be tried is drawn from the panel, we allow
examination of each prospective juror concerning possible conflicting
interest in the matter he will hear, or possible bias in favor of or
prejudice against any litigant or his counsel or concerning the subject
matter of the litigation. In addition, we give each side the right
arbitrarily to exclude from the jury a limited number of persons
(usually six in a civil case and fifteen to twenty in a criminal case).
To achieve fairness we also grant a civil litigant or criminal de-
fendant the right to assistance of counsel (in some criminal cases
at the expense of the state), to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him, to require that testimony be given under oath and
that irrelevant or incompetent evidence be excluded, to produce
his own witnesses and to compel their attendance by court order.
We protect the individual accused of crime by presuming him to
be innocent of the charge and requiring the state to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under our law there are only a few
instances in which evidence of prior criminal convictions may be
introduced and a confession may not be considered until it has
been determined that it was voluntarily given. We also accord an
accused, unless he deliberately waives his rights, a prompt and
public trial. We protect the defendant in civil litigation by imposing
on the plaintiff the burden of proof and instructing the jury that
unless plaintiff's evidence outweighs that of defendant, the burden
has not been met, and they must return a verdict for defendant.
All of these safeguards have been established and are maintained
to secure trial by reason. Almost all of them are constitutionally
protected rights.
Equally fundamental to our concept of constitutional government
is "The maintenance of the opportunity for free . . . discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
*Remarks delivered before the Forum on the Mass Media, held at the University of
North Dakota on October 31, 1964.
**Justice, Supreme Court of the Staee of New York. B.S., 1936, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity; LL.B., 1938, University of Maryland; Chairman, Editorial Board, Maryland Law
Review, 1937o1938. Member of the Bars of Maryland, District of Columbia and New York.
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and that changes may be obtained by lawful means. . .. ,"I The
First Amendment protects that right, and the guarantees of that
amendment were adopted because, as Mr. Justice Brandeis so
succinctly put it, "Those who won our independence believed . . . in
the power of reason as applied through public discussion .... ,2
Reason is thus engrained in both free press and fair trial, but
nowhere does the Constitution tell us what to do in the event that
fair trial requirements conflict with free press protection. Yet
conflict does exist and must be resolved. To state that obvious
proposition is also to acknowledge that both cannot be absolute
rights. My thesis is that neither right is absolute, that the interests
on both sides must be balanced, and that the conclusion of any
balancing based on reason must be that, to the extent necessary
to protect the individual's right to fair trial, specific limitations of
the free press right are constitutionally permissible.
As recently as March 9, 1964, the Supreme Court has recognized
that freedom of expression is not an absolute right, for on that
day, despite the contrary views of Justices Goldberg, Douglas and
Black, the Court said in the New York Times case3 that there is a
qualified, rather than an absolute privilege with respect to libel of
public officials. Earlier it had in Beauharnais v. Illinois,' upheld
a criminal libel statute as applied to a publication which was defama-
tory of a racial group and liable to cause violence, and in Speiser
v. Randall,5 stated that "considerations of the greatest urgency
can justify restrictions on speech, and . . . the validity of a restraint
on speech in each case depends on careful analysis of the particular
circumstances." Bridges v. California,6 Pennekamp v. Florida,7
Craig v. Harney,8 and more recently Wood v. Georgia 9 have all
considered the use of the contempt power to deal with a claimed
obstruction of justice. While each has struck down the exercise of
the power in the particular case, all have applied the clear and
present danger test, and Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in the New
York Times case makes clear that a majority of the present Court
accept that application. Though refusing in the four cases referred
to to sanction use of the contempt power with respect to criticism
of judges, the Court has emphasized that the cases did not "represent
a situation where an individual is on trial"'1 and noted that "trials
are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting
hall, the radio, and the newspaper""' and that "of course the
1. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
2. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion).
3. New York Times v. Sullivan, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
4. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
5. 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958).
6. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
7. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
8. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
9. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
10. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S., at 389 (1962).
11. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S., at 271 (1941).
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limitations on free speech assume a different proportion when ex-
pression is directed toward a trial as compared to a grand jury
investigation. '12 It has also taken pains to make clear that it was
dealing with the common law contempt power, which it characterized
"as of the most general and undefined nature,"' 8 not with "the full
reach of the power of the state to protect the administration of
justice by its courts"' " and commented that the judgment did not
come to the Supreme Court "encased in the armor wrought by
prior legislative deliberation"' 5 and that "the legislature .. . has
not appraised a particular kind of situation and found a specific
danger sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on a particular
kind of utterance."' 1 Not all of the quoted statements were essential
to the decision reached in the particular case; they do not, therefore,
have binding force in future cases.
Viewed in the context of the Court's free speech decisions,
however, one may hazard the conclusion that a statute containing
a legislative specification of the particular kinds of expression pro-
hibited and the circumstances under which and the length of time
for which the prohibitions are to operate and legislative findings,
preferably, but not necessarily, based on scientific data, that the
prohibited expressions constitute serious and imminent dangers to
the right to a fair trial, would be held constitutional.
A question does exist concerning whether such a statute can
limit publication of matter revealed on preliminary hearing or which
is offered but excluded during trial. There are several Supreme
Court cases indicating that what transpires in a courtroom during
preliminary hearing or during trial may be published."7 Those cases
do not, however, consider the problem in relation to a statute listing
specific material and delaying rather than prohibiting its publication.
Whether such a statute should be enacted depends upon whether
there is any other means of dealing effectively with the fair trial
problem and whether the detriment to free discussion resulting
from such a statute offsets its benefits to fair trial.
With increasing frequency convictions are being reversed on due
process grounds, because of prejudicial publicity. 8  The reversal
of a judgment or conviction when essential unfairness has been
12. Wood v. Georgia, supra note 10, at 390.
13. Bridges v. California, supra note 11, at 260.
14. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S., at 373 (1947).
15. Bridges v. California, supra note 11, at 261, reiterated in Wood v. Georgia, eupra
note 10, at 386.
16. Bridges v. California, upra note 11, at 260, 261.
17. Craig v. Harney, &upra note 14, at 374; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 193
(1952). A number of states have statutes under which preliminary hearing may be
closed, Geis, Preliminary Hearing and The Press 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 397 (1961).
18. In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (196A) ; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
and more recently Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (1964) state convictions were
set aside as in violation of the due process clause; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310 (1959) is a reversal of a federal conviction.
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demonstrated does correct for the prejudice underlying the judgment
or conviction, but for a number of reasons reversal is not an adequate
corrective. Cardinal among those reasons is that all of the expenses
of the abortive trial and of the appeal necessary to upset it must
be borne by the litigant or the accused, and in cases likely to attract
substantial publicity, such expenses are apt to be in the tens of
thousands of dollars. Important also to an accused who is unable
to obtain bail but is acquitted on the second trial is that he has
been unnecessarily deprived of his liberty for the period of time
necessary to conduct his first trial and carry out his appeal. Finally,
if both those points be overlooked, and it be assumed that sufficient
additional funds to pay the cost of the second trial will be available,
the litigant or accused may still have been prejudiced by the inter-
vening death or disappearance of a material witness. 19 What is
true of reversal is, of course, applicable, though in lesser degree,
to an order by the trial court terminating the trial or setting aside
a verdict because of prejudicial publicity.
Nor are any of the other available correctives more satisfactory.
The place of trial can be changed, but such a change has little
meaning in view of the breadth of modern press, radio and television
coverage and its ability to move with the trial. Further, such a
change makes more difficult and expensive the attendance of wit-
nesses and the conduct of the trial, and with respect to a person
accused, is an exception to his right to be tried in the locality
where the crime was committed. In some states it is possible,
instead of changing the place of trial, to bring in jurors from other
counties, 20 but this offers no protection against infection of the
out-of-county jurors by publicity during the trial, and causes in-
convenience and possible resentment on the part of jurors imported
from other parts of the state. Trial can also be delayed until the
effects of the adverse publicity have worn off, but there is no
scientific method of determining how long such a delay should be.
The court must, therefore, make an "educated guess." The guess
will tend to be too short since court dockets must be kept reasonably
current, but if it is too long that will be small consolation to a
person criminally accused, to whom the Constitution guarantees the
right to a speedy trial.
Locking up the jury is sometimes put forward as a solution.
Obviously the procedure does not meet the problem of pre-trial
publicity and even with respect to publicity during trial it is virtually
19. Though by statute (e.g. N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. § 4517) and at common law, Fleury v.
Edwards, 14 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1964), testimony taken on the prior trial is admissible, it is
subject on the second trial to any proper objection even though not made at the first
trial.
20. Authorized by the statutes of Arkansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Virginia and West Virginia, and discussed in Note, Community Hostility and the Right
to An Impartial Jury, 60 COL. L. REv. 349, 365 ff. (1960).
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impossible to seal the jurors off completely. When the procedure
is followed the jury must be locked up from the inception of a case,
for the court has no way of knowing in advance when prejudicial
matter will be published. Yet the inconvenience of being separated
from family and home during an entire trial or even any substantial
part of a trial of some length will not be lightly accepted by the
jurors, who may, in consequence, feel some resentment against
the person requesting the lock-up procedure.
Waiver of the right to trial by jury is also suggested at times,
on the theory that judges are less likely than jurors to succumb to
the pressure of prejudice. Under present law there is in most states
no absolute right to waive jury trial; in civil cases the consent of
the opposing side is required; in criminal cases the trial judge has
discretion for good cause to reject the waiver. Moreover, in light
of the importance attached to trial by jury in our system of justice,
even an absolute right to waive jury trial would be abdication to,
rather than solution of, the problem of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
It is, of course, possible to question prospective jurors concerning
pre-trial publicity, but to do so compounds the prejudice by bringing
it once again and more specifically to the jurors' attention, and
presupposes the ability of the average juror to control his sub-
conscious as well as his conscious reactions. Further, it leaves the
litigant or accused largely dependent upon the answer the juror,
already conditioned by the adverse publicity, chooses to give to the
inquiry whether he can, notwithstanding the publicity, render an
impartial verdict according to the evidence. 21 Finally, if a juror
is seated notwithstanding his admission that it will take some
evidence to overcome the impression he has formed, 22 the effect
is to reverse the presumption of innocence in a criminal case or
the burden of proof rules applicable in a civil case.
Jurors are regularly instructed not to read about, listen to
comments about, or discuss a case while it is on trial. While the
last two parts of the admonition are probably adhered to, it is
doubtful that the first part is.23 Indeed, it is extremely difficult
for a juror in a metropolitan area to avoid reading at least such
matter as appears in the headlines visible to him in subways or
on newsstands as he travels between home and court. Jurors may
also be instructed not to consider in their deliberations matter which
has come to their attention improperly, but such instructions are
21. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 376(2) under which, however, the eourt must
be satisfied that the Juror does not entertain such a present opinion or impression as
would influence his verdict.
22. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) ; Low v. State, 156 Tex. Crim.
34, 238 S.W.2d 769 (1951).
23. Thus in United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 857 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 946 (1952) (memorandum of Frankfurter, J.5, a copy of the offending article
was found in the jury room.
THE JUDGE'S VIEW
subject to the same vagaries that are involved with juror exami-
nation.2 4  Such an instruction, it has been said, is equivalent to
telling a little boy to go stand in the corner and not to think about
a white elephant. Certainly, it will be all the more difficult for
jurors to follow such an instruction because the material placed
before them by the improper publicity has not been subjected to
the protective procedures of confrontation, cross-examination and
rebuttal.
It thus appears that the only completely effectual solution of
the problem is to prevent the prejudice from occurring initially, 25
by delaying publication until the danger is past. Are there detriments
to free discussion resulting from a statute so providing?
The argument most vociferously advanced is that such a statute
would be but the first step on the road to censorship in its vilest
forms, that the camel must not be permitted to get his nose under
the tent. The argument is, of course, based on fear rather than
reason and against it must be balanced the fear that an individual
will lose his liberty or his life or a substantial portion of his property
without just cause. Reason's answer is the Supreme Court, for
while that "Court sits it retains and exercises authority to nullify
action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise
of punishing ' ' 28 the obstruction of justice. Fear of the camel need
not transform us into ostriches!
Denial to the people of their right to know what goes on in
crime, law enforcement and government circles is another argument
often advanced. No one will deny that publicity concerning such
matters is an important check on corruption and incompetency of
public officials and on the control of crime generally. 27 But publicity
and discussion of these matters will not be prevented by a statute
concerned only with specific items (e.g. - the confession of a person
accused or his prior criminal record, man-in-the-street polls or
editorial comment concerning guilt) and which proscribes publication
only for the period essential to protect the right to fair trial. That
such delay in publication of particular items does not thwart the
24. For Mr. Justice Jackson the assumption that prejudicial publicity could thus be
overcome was "unmitigated fiction," Krulewitch v, United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
25. As Judge Markell eloquently put it in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, 512 (1949), Cert. denied 338 U.S. 912 (1950),
existing correctives "at best only circumvent some consequences of an achieved obstruc-
tion of justice." The right to sue for libel is not a solution, for it can reach only de-
famatory publications and may be defended on the ground of truth or privilege, Patter-
son v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Only Pennsylvania has provided a statutory action
[PA. STAT. ANN. title 17, § 2045 (1930)] in favor of a person "aggrieved by publication
concerning his trial, which would improperly tend to bias the minds" of the triers of
fact. Though the statute has been on the books since 1836, no action has been brought
under it, Probably because the plaintiff in such an action, Drojudiced in the original
action, may be hard put by the very result thus produced to show injury. See Note, 27
TEMP. L.Q. 490 (1953-54).
26. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).
27. Gillmor, 'Trial By Newspaper'; The Constitutional ConflUct Between Free Press
and Fair Trial in English and American Law (unpublished dissertation) p. 359 ff. details
a number of instances in which incompetency or corruption was exposed.
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public interest is evidenced by the fact that responsible New York
papers did, at the request of the United States Attorney, exclude
specified details from their reports of the Appalachin conspiracy trial
and from a later narcotics trial2s and that many papers in kidnap
cases voluntarily limit publication before the victim has been located.
News stories reporting the arrest of an individual on a particular
charge may quite community anxiety resulting from the crime, and
broadsiding the description of a fugitive from justice will aid in
the fugitive's capture. However, legislation need not prevent either.
Newspapers also sometimes dig up leads or evidence helpful to the
prosecution or to prove the innocence of a person accused; publicity
may be of value in turning up witnesses. The statute would not
affect newspaper investigations, though it might delay publication
of some of the evidence turned up. It would not prevent publicity
concerning the occurrence, though it would probably tone down
some of the more sensational reporting. Sensationalism is not neces-
sary, however, to bring the occurrence to a prospective witness'
attention; indeed, by creating an atmosphere of prejudice or emotion,
such reporting is just as likely to deter witnesses from coming
forth as it is to bring them forth.
Crime news reporting, it is sometimes urged, is a crime deter-
rent. The conclusion is, however, unsupported by any scientific
data; in fact it seems distinctly possible that the contrary could be
demonstrated. The argument is, in any event, irrelevant, for the
proposed statute would not prohibit such reporting. It would simply
delay particular items for a limited time. Whatever deterrent effect
publicity presently has will, therefore, continue notwithstanding the
proposed statute.
Thus, it appears, statutory limitation that forfeits none of the
benefits of free discussion can be devised. Moreover, substantial
benefits to the press can result from such legislation. The phrase
"obstruction of the administration of justice" which describes the
offense sought to be punished in contempt proceedings has an uncom-
fortable umbrella-like quality for the press. Legislation would
catalogue the specific kinds of publications and the length of time
during which publication is proscribed. Contempt proceedings are
summary in nature, often tried before the judge who issued the
citation, always tried without a jury, and in some jurisdictions
without limitation as to punishment.2 9 Legislation could, as federal30
28. One such Instance is reported in Wessel, Procedural Safeguards for the Mass
Conspiracy Trial, 48 A.B.A.J. 628, 630 (1962) and a second in a letter from United
States Attorney Morgenthau printed on the editorial page of the New York Herald
Tribune of July 24, 1962. But note that when New York County District Attorney Frank
Hogan In 1954 announced a policy of declining to disclose the contents of statements
made by prospective defendants in criminal investigations, he was roundly criticized by
the press, see N.Y.L.J. April 22, 1954, p. 4.
29. And, it might be noted, at least at common law, without a right of appeal. Not
until the Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, did our British breth-
ren give a limited right of appeal to the House of Lords.
30. 15 U.S.C. 401, formerly 28 U.S.C. 385 (1940 ed.).
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and New York 1 statutes have since 1831 or earlier, take from the
courts the power to punish publication as contempt and establish
a new misdemeanor. Such legislation could fix the limits of the
punishment that could be imposed for violation, require procedure
by information or indictment, and give the right to trial by jury
before a judge having no connection With the publication. 2 That
portion of the statute taking away a court's power to punish contempt-
by-publication may be attacked as an unconstitutional invasion by
the legislature of the power of the courts. The federal and New York
statutes have, however, withstood the test of time notwithstanding
this separation-of-powers argument and while there are cases in
some states invalidating analogous statutes on this basis, most of
them antedate the Supreme Court's decision in the Nye8s case.
Though study of the constitution of a particular state would be
required before a clear answer could be given, the proposed legis-
lation would, I believe, withstand separation-of-powers attack in
most states.
Space does not permit me to spell out fully the details of such
a statute. The central thoughts are that it would specify what
material was proscribed and for how long, and that its proscriptions
would apply to the bar and to law enforcement personnel as well
as to the press.
The period of time that the statute would delay publication
would begin with the commission of a crime or the commencement
of a civil suit and continue until trial by jury is waived, or in a
jury case, until the particular material is admitted in evidence, or,
if it is never admitted, until the verdict is rendered. Thus, it would
proscribe publication only for the period essential to protect the
right to fair trial. Note also that it would not apply to a non-jury
trial. Not that a judge, especially if he is elected to office or serving
a short term, may not be influenced by newspaper publicity, but that
most of the specific items hereafter referred to must come to his
attention in any event when he rules on the admissibility of evidence,
and that the Supreme Court has made clear that in its view such
a statute is not necessary with respect to judges.3'
The specific items covered by the statute would be divided into
two categories, the first covering matter the publication of which
it can be said as a matter of law presents a serious and imminent
31. N.Y. JUDICiARY LAW § 750(A) (6).
32. United States v. Barnett, 84 Sup. Ct 984 (1964) makes clear that there is no
constitutional right to jury trial In contempt cases. While provision of a Jury In con-
tempt cases has been held unconstitutional as In violation of the seperation of powers
doctrine [Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 28 COL. I REv. 401, 525 ff. (1928)],
this rule should not apply to the proposed statute which creates a substantive crime.
33. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
34. In the Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig cases, stpra, notes 6, 7 and 8.
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danger of substantial prejudice, the second covering matter the
publication of which would not constitute an offense unless a jury
found as a fact that in the circumstances of the case concerning
which publication was" made the material published created such
a danger of substantial prejudice.
In the first category would fall publication of the fact that a
confession had been made, or of the prior criminal record of an
accused or litigant, of an offer of settlement in a civil case, state-
ments relating to the character or credibility of a witness or party,
expressions of opinion concerning the guilt of an accused. In the
second category would fall interviews with the family of the victim
of a crime, statements that a witness will testify to particular facts,
publication of the names and addresses of the jurors sitting in the
case, 5 or of matter which appeals to racial, political, economic or
other bias. The question whether publications of the second kind
pose substantial and imminent danger to fair trial is one of degree
in which the stage of the case at which publication occurs, the
context in which published, whether the proceeding is civil or
criminal in nature, and what specific subject it involves, are all
important elements. Note, however, that the jury would not be
required to find actual prejudice, 6 but rather that a clear and
present danger of substantial prejudice from the publication existed.
One further provision should be contained in the statute. Journal-
ists often point out that the source of much of what is reported
is the lawyer or prosecutor handling the case, who in passing on
information about pending litigation is acting in violation of Canon
20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. In all the more than fifty
years that Canon has been on the books, there has not been one
reported proceeding against an offending lawyer, prosecutor or
judge.3 7 To augment the Canon, the statute should prohibit not only
an attorney or prosecutor but also any employee of an attorney or
prosecutor or the police department or the courts from furnishing
information the publication of which would be prohibited under the
statute.
Neither fair trial nor free discussion is the exclusive province
of either the journalism or the legal profession; both are citizens'
rights or in a broader sense rights of society. Reporting which
35. United States v. Borelll, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964).
36. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), make clear that a showing of actual
prejudice is not required. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), is not to the con-
trary as its analysis of the Irvin case shows.
37. BLAUSTETN & PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 271 (1954). A recent opinion of the
Committee on Ethics of the Colorado Bar Association seeks to implement the canon by
spelling out specific kinds of statements that violate the canon. The canon is in effect
as a statute or court rule or by adoption of the state bar association In Puerto Rico and
all of the fifty states except Alabama, California and Oregon, though in Massachusetts,
New York and Texas it has been modified, BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONs, A TORNEYS AND
JUDGEs 822 (Supp. 1956 & 1959).
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creates an atmosphere of essential unfairness has resulted in reversal
of jury verdicts. In the recognition that reversal and consequent
retrial is an unfair burden on both the state and the individuals
involved, responsible newspapers have acceded to requests that
particular material not be published until admitted in evidence or
until conclusion of the trial. The proposed statute would make
that principle applicable to all newspapermen, all law enforcement
personnel and all members of the legal profession. It would apply
only to jury trials, limit publication only of specified material and
impose that limitation only for the time necessary to protect the
right to a fair trial. For more than seventy years 8 a dialogue
between the professions of journalism and the law has continued.
Both sides purport to speak in the name of society, but more often
than not seem more interested in fixing blame than in arriving at
an acceptable solution. Joint efforts made in 1925, 193739 and 195340
to draft a voluntary code all came to naught. In the last few years,
guides have been jointly prepared in Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
Oregon, and the tragic event of last November has spurred efforts
elsewhere to define standards. But it is worthy of note that when
Dr. Frank Stanton of Columbia Broadcasting System in his recent
Annenberg School lecture proposed establishment of new standards,
the other two principal networks promptly demurred. Until it has
been more clearly demonstrated that the press and the bar are
willing to accept responsibility for, and have the means of, policing
their respective professions, one must conclude that only a statute
such as proposed can achieve the balance between journalism and
justice, between freedom of discussion and the right to a fair and
impartial trial, that the interests of society demand.
38. The earliest article found was published in 1892: Forrest, Trial by Newspapers,
14 CRIM. LAW MAGAZINE 550.
39. Report of Joint Committee of the American Bar Association, the American News-
paper Publishers Association and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 62 A.B.A.
REP. 851 (1937).
40. The code drafted by a New York County Lawyers Association Committee in that
year is set forth at the end of OTTERsOURG, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, 39 A.B.A.J.
978 (1953).
